



# Père Castor 🐻, raconte-nous une histoire (d'OPS)

David Aparicio

Worldline Brown Bag Lunches (BBL)  
Mardi 11 Octobre 2022, 13h

---

[@dadideo](#)

# David Aparicio

15/ DD INSA de Lyon / UNICAMP (Brésil)

Facebook Open Academy / MIT AppInventor


17/ Dev(Sec)Ops @ AMADEUS (Nice, 2 ans)

19/ Data(Sec)Ops @ OVHcloud (Lyon, 3 ans)





# OVHcloud



400 000  
serveurs

1,6 million  
de clients

Leader  
européen

2021  
IPO

30 Datacenters



gaia-x

SecNumCloud  
Depuis Déc 2020



New

## Database as a Service

Logos for PostgreSQL, MySQL, mongoDB, redis, Grafana, M3, cassandra, and OpenSearch.

## Ingestion

New

kafka

## Data Processing

APACHE Spark

## AI Tools

New

Logos for TensorFlow, Learn, jupyter, and a smiley face icon.

Notebooks Training





---

# Qui êtes-vous ?

Plutôt Dev, Ops, Étudiant, Autre (Designer, PM, Coach Agile) ?



---

**Qui a déjà possédé un téléphone d'astreinte ?**



# Agenda

Introduction

Elliot

Legacy

Free Food

Retour du Legacy

DNS

Blast Effect

NewsBlur

Same JVM, shoot again

Foxstuck

CDN

Conclusion



# Introduction





**Alex Hidalgo**

@ahidalgosre

I think it's time for another round of this: Everyone, especially senior engineers, share a time you accidentally brought down or deleted prod, why it turned out fine, and how you're still kicking ass in the industry today.

10:15 PM · Apr 15, 2022 · Twitter Web App

**76** Retweets**108** Quote Tweets**691** Likes[Alex Hidalgo](#)



https://forum.compagnons-devops.fr/t/partage-de-minutes-fail/1659



## Partage de minutes fail

Général



Uggla Compagnon

avr. '21

Bonjour un petit sujet pour partager un peu nos mésaventures quotidiennes... Et se défouler quand les choses vont mal.

La vm du jour, tout va bien... (note la vm host le node d'un cluster flink qui bizarrement est hs.)

```
top - 12:24:11 up 66 days, 17:34, 1 user, load average: 1688,85, 1011,22, 712,98
Tasks: 1191 total, 1 running, 1188 sleeping, 0 stopped, 2 zombie
%Cpu(s): 0,2 us 0,4 sy, 0,0 ni, 99,4 id, 0,0 wa, 0,0 hi, 0,0 si, 0,0 st
KiB Mem : 16259496 total, 8284772 free, 4928824 used, 3045900 buff/cache
KiB Swap: 4194300 total, 4194212 free, 88 used. 10080532 avail Mem
```

Note 1: En bon 🐱 noir, ça arrive forcément juste le Vendredi avant les vacances.

Note 2: J'ai pas la main sur cette infra, mais je crois que qq chose va pas bien.

3 ❤️ 🔗

🔗 Un live tous les premiers vendredis de chaque mois à 17h !

créé

dernière réponse

73

1,1 k

17

108

9



avr. '21

🕒 2 j

réponses

vues

utilisateurs


J'aime

liens





# Post-mortem





---

# Examen post-incident

Identification de l'incident (détection, sonde)  
Flux d'informations et communication (canaux)  
Structure (organisation)

Utilisation des ressources (vitesse, optimum)  
Processus (SLA)  
Création de rapports (interne et externe)



[Le guide complet de gestion des incidents ITIL](#)





# Exemples récents

Jun 21, 2022

## Cloudflare Service Issues

**Postmortem** - [Read details](#)

Jun 21, 18:30 UTC

**Resolved** - This incident has been resolved.

Jun 21, 08:06 UTC

**Update** - We are still monitoring the result.

Jun 21, 07:51 UTC

**Monitoring** - A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

Jun 21, 07:20 UTC

**Identified** - The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

Jun 21, 06:57 UTC

**Investigating** - A critical P0 incident was declared at approximately 06:34AM UTC. Connectivity in Cloudflare's network has been disrupted in broad regions.

Customers attempting to reach Cloudflare sites in impacted regions will observe 500 errors. The incident impacts all data plane services in our network.

We will continue updating you when we have more information.

Jun 21, 06:43 UTC



## User reports indicate problems at Microsoft Teams

Microsoft Teams is an online collaboration platform that allows users to chat, have meetings, and share notes and attachments. Microsoft Teams is part of Office 365.

I have a problem with Microsoft Teams

### Microsoft Teams outages reported in the last 24 hours



Incidents du 21 Juin 2022 : [Status de Cloudflare](#) / [Status de Microsoft Teams](#)



# Elliot






# Elliot Alderson






# Allsafe, great place to work 2022







# Time to code






# P1 detected, tout le monde sur le pont





# Root cause





# AWS, GitLab, DigitalOcean

AWS / Drop database <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/message/680587/">https://aws.amazon.com/message/680587/</a>	24/12/2012
Gitlab / Drop database <a href="https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2017/02/10/postmortem-of-database-outage-of-january-31/">https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2017/02/10/postmortem-of-database-outage-of-january-31/</a>	31/01/2017
DigitalOcean / Drop database <a href="https://www.digitalocean.com/blog/update-on-the-april-5th-2017-outage/">https://www.digitalocean.com/blog/update-on-the-april-5th-2017-outage/</a>	05/04/2017



## Conseils

Insérer une approbation manuelle / revue

Auditer et protéger l'environnement (SIEM, RBAC)


Informations d'identification/connexion protégé en lieu sûr (Vault, KeePass)

Tester vos procédures de restauration (backup)

# Attention !

Ne mets pas tes doigts  
dans la prod, tu risques  
de te faire pincer très fort.

[clever-cloud.com](https://clever-cloud.com)





# Conseils

Insérer une approbation manuelle / revue

Auditer et protéger l'environnement (SIEM, RBAC)

Informations d'identification/connexion protégé en lieu sûr (Vault, KeePass)

Tester vos procédures de restauration (backup)

# Cas non isolé: le stagiaire

5:30 ↗

📶 5G 🔋




Integration Test Email #1 Inbox



HBO Max 5:24 PM

to me ▾




This template is used by integration tests only.



[Today](#) - HBO Max explains cryptic email that accidentally went to subscribers (18 June 2021)



# Mailing / Publipostage



Dear Customer,

Your following OVHcloud customer account(s) are inactive for more than twenty-four (24) months in our information system.

List of inactive customer account(s):

If you do not take any action within 30 days of receiving this email, we will close your account(s) in accordance with OVHcloud's personal data usage policy.

If you no longer wish to use the account(s) in question, and you no longer need the information associated to them (history, invoices, etc.), you do not need to do anything. The account(s) will be closed automatically.

If you wish to keep one or more of these accounts and continue to access and use them, please log in to the relevant account(s) again via your OVHcloud



Dear Customer,

Earlier today, we have sent you an email by mistake.

Indeed, as part of our ongoing activities to maintain our compliance with GDPR, we are constantly conducting campaigns towards our inactive customers.

Due to a settings issue, you have received this communication. Please disregard it.

We sincerely apologize for the inconvenience.

Kind regards,

OVHcloud team



OVHcloud - Answer (11 October 2021)





# Les tests en PROD



## ← Notifications

lundi 24 janvier, 20:27

"C'est bon Julien, ça fonctionne ! 👍"  
Il s'agissait bien sûr d'un test de nos équipes techniques :)

"OK Julien, it works! 👍"  
It was of course a technical test :)



# Legacy






# Il était une fois.. (en 2020)






# Quand soudain l'astreinte sonne






# Legacy






# Legacy..









# L'astreinte sonne à nouveau





# TECH DEBT









# Codons! Le bon et le mauvais patch (dev)

CODE ENTROPY





# Méthode KISS



**KEEP  
CALM  
AND  
KISS**

*Original:*

*Keep  
It  
Simple  
Stupid*

*Variante :*

*Keep  
It  
Super  
Simple*



```
#!/bin/bash
# Script to test server connectivity
set -euo pipefail
IFS=$'\n\t'

HOST="host"
PORT="8080"
TIMEOUT="10"
EXIT_FAIL_AND_RESTART="1"
EXIT_FAILURE_ON_RESTART="255"

## Did we get a timeout? ##
if echo "Hello Server, please kick me" | timeout ${TIMEOUT} nc -w20 ${HOST} ${PORT}
then
    echo "Success: Server alive."
    exit 0
else
    "$(date)"
    echo "Failure: Server timeout." >&2
    echo "Restarting the service..."
    if service server status && date && service server restart
    then
        echo "Restart done"
        exit ${EXIT_FAIL_AND_RESTART}
    else
        echo "Restart failure"
        exit ${EXIT_FAILURE_ON_RESTART}
    fi
fi
```




# Legacy





# Attention: Serveur





# Free Food





# Free food

↑ Posted by u/luciferous22 3 years ago


52 ↓ A glitch in uber eats payment method with a partner company allowed users to order food without paying. Students in our city completely exploited this glitch and ordered around 14000 USD of free food.



<https://twitter.com/GergelyOrosz/status/1502947315279187979>



Big Simplification of the architecture only for understanding ;-)



```
switch customerWalletResponse {
  case Successful:
    return http.StatusOK
  case Failure:
    return http.StatusPaymentRequired
  default:
    return http.StatusInternalServerError
}
```

**Gergely Orosz @GergelyOrosz · Mar 13**

6. Before

1. "Try to charge wallet X without funds" -> Error1
2. "Try to charge wallet X without funds again" -> Error1

After


1. "Try to charge wallet X without funds" -> Error1
2. "Try to charge wallet X without funds again" -> A Brand New Error

 <https://twitter.com/GergelyOrosz/status/1502947315279187979>





Big Simplification of the architecture only for understanding ;-)



```
switch customerWalletResponse {
  case Successful:
    return http.StatusOK
  case Failure:
    return http.StatusPaymentRequired
  case SameQueryRetried:
    return http.StatusTooManyRequests
  default:
    return http.StatusInternalServerError
}
```

Tips: Don't trust API (like client's inputs)

And fail securely (OWASP)



<https://twitter.com/GergelyOrosz/status/1502947315279187979>




# Le retour du Legacy





# L'astreinte sonne.. ...






# Il était une autre fois.. (en 2021)





# OOMKiller



Daniel Stori (turnoff.us)





# Message de Santé Publique France

LEGACY

## LE CODE LEGACY, POUR SE PROTÉGER ET PROTÉGER LES AUTRES

- 

Se laver les mains avant,  
pendant et après avoir touché  
cette merde inmaintenable
- 

Protéger ses yeux de ce code  
imbuvable en profitant  
notamment des compilations
- 

Utiliser des mouchoirs propres  
quand l'envie de pleurer vous  
vient et que vous questionnez  
votre choix de vie pour ce poste
- 

Ne saluez plus et  
n'adressez plus la parole à  
la personne responsable  
de ce code de merde

Vous avez des questions sur le code legacy ?





 [LESJOIESDUCODE.FR](https://www.lesjoiesducodes.fr)



# Senior vs Junior

OBSERVER

MONKEYUSER.COM





## Code

```
#!/bin/bash
FLAG=/home/myuser/_MAINTENANCE_ONGOING.flag

echo "STEP 1 - STOP SERVICE"
systemctl status dremio && systemctl stop dremio

echo "STEP 2 - CREATE THE FLAG TO AVOID OTHER actions"
touch $FLAG

echo "STEP 3 - RUN DREMIO CLEANING SCRIPT"
dremio-admin clean --max-job-days 15
dremio-admin clean --delete-orphans
dremio-admin clean --compact
dremio-admin clean --reindex-data

echo "STEP 4 - START SERVICE"
systemctl status dremio && systemctl start dremio

echo "STEP 5 - REMOVE THE FLAG"
rm $FLAG
```





# DNS





Time to reset the counter: [@JenMsft](#)



# Disaster Nominal Source





# Slack



## Thursday September 30, 2021

### Incident

#### Less than 1% of users may be experiencing trouble connecting to Slack



We've confirmed this issue is now resolved. If you're still encountering any issues connecting, please reload Slack using Ctrl + Shift + R (Windows/Linux) / Command + Shift + R (Mac) on desktop, or fully quit and reopen Slack on mobile. If that doesn't help, let us know at [feedback@slack.com](mailto:feedback@slack.com).

If you tried switching to Google DNS during the course of this issue, you can choose to keep this enabled, or switch back using these steps:

[https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/docs/using#switch\\_back\\_to\\_your\\_old\\_dns\\_settings](https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/docs/using#switch_back_to_your_old_dns_settings)

Our sincere apologies for the interruption to your work, and we appreciate you bearing with us in the meantime. We'll be back with a full summary of the issue.

Note: We've adjusted the timestamp of this update to accurately reflect the issue's time of resolution.

Oct 1, 5:49 PM GMT+2

Apologies for the continued trouble. It will take some time for the DNS changes to resolve this issue for everyone. If organization policy permits, and if you are comfortable making this change, switching to Google DNS may improve things in the meantime. Please find guides below:





# DNS workaround

THERE ARE 40 COMMENTS.

shacky003

Pointing your DNS queries to Google (8.8.8.8) or Cloudflare (1.1.1.1) isn't a solution as the article clearly states that BGP route lists were removed globally for the affected domains. It may have worked temporarily due to stale records, but it isn't a fix, as the BGP routes were removed from all public DNS providers.

If a phone number is erased from all phonebooks, getting another phonebook isn't going to help. The routes have to be refreshed/reloaded from the top down..

Posted on **Oct 4, 2021 | 1:46 PM**

Pixelated

Just change it to 8.8.8.8

Posted on **Oct 4, 2021 | 12:08 PM**

Tommy\_P

Or 1.1.1.1

Posted on **Oct 4, 2021 | 12:26 PM**

descendency

Tried both. Neither are showing records for facebook.

Posted on **Oct 4, 2021 | 12:49 PM**

mobile\_phoney

Or 1-800-PP5-1-DOODOO

Posted on **Oct 4, 2021 | 2:19 PM**

NukedKaltak

That's not how it works.





# Cloudflare: 21-June-22

```
! term REJECT-THE-REST { ... }
! term 4-ADV-SITE-LOCALS { ... }
! term 6-ADV-SITE-LOCALS { ... }
```

## Une mise à jour de longue haleine

Modification d'un grand projet (18 mois) pour améliorer la résilience des POP

## Modification de la configuration réseau

Tous les utilisateurs n'arrivent plus à accéder aux services de Cloudflare, de 19 DCs

## Fin de l'incident

Les dernières erreurs disparaissent  
Les utilisateurs arrivent pleinement à utiliser les outils de Cloudflare





### Début du déploiement de la nouvelle conf

D'après les graphes du Post-Mortem de Cloudflare

### Application du patch


Le premier DC est à nouveau accessible







# FB: 04-Oct-21





# Julia Evans

FAV

## Tools to explore BGP Lectures

Julia Evans @b0rk · Oct 5


ok I think I understand it better thanks to this tweet! it's much easier to look at the route announcements right before / right after all the routes were deleted because it's a lot less messy

NAYFIELD @Nayfield · Oct 4

Replying to @Nayfield and @JaneLytv

This is connectivity of that network block before and after the configuration change.

Factual summary: The network used to be well connected to the Internet. After a config change, it's not connected. This network contains half of the DNS servers for Facebook and properties.



### Mon blog



#### La panne Facebook du 4 octobre 2021

Première rédaction de cet article le 4 octobre 2021  
Dernière mise à jour le 5 octobre 2021

#### Autres trucs

Accueil  
Seulement les RFC

Seulement les fiches de lecture



Mathis Hammel @MathisHammel · Oct 5

THREAD : Hier, une panne massive a affecté Facebook et plein de ses services (Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger, ...)

Mais il s'est passé quoi au juste ? Je vous explique tout ça. [👉](#)  
[#FacebookDown](#) [#InstagramDown](#)



Thanks for being here, come back so


**CLOUDFLARE** The Cloudflare Blog

Product News Speed & Reliability Security Serverless Zero Trust Developers Deep Dive

## Understanding How Facebook Disappeared from the Internet

04/10/2021

Celso Martinho Tom Strick



Cécile @AtaxyaNetwork · Oct 4

Bon, on va faire un petit thread plus technique ou je vais tenter d'expliquer au fur et à mesure que je récupère des infos de vous expliquer ce qui se passe chez Facebook !  
(Spoiler alert: je suis pas la plus grande experte du réseau, alors il peut y avoir des choses imparfaite)

Cécile @AtaxyaNetwork · Oct 4

On peut dire que j'ai franchi un nouveau palier ? 🤖  
[bfmtv.com/tech/facebook-...](https://bfmtv.com/tech/facebook-...)

demandé, qui prend en réalité la forme d'une suite de chiffres baptisée adresse IP.

*"Vers 15h50, Facebook a arrêté d'envoyer ses IPs au reste du monde. En conséquence, les serveurs DNS ne sont plus accessibles par les opérateurs, et donc la traduction du nom de domaine vers l'adresse IP ne peut plus se faire. Ce qui entraîne l'inaccessibilité partout dans le monde des services Facebook (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp)" résumé Cécile Morange, technicienne réseau, auprès de BFMTV.*

Par analogie, le système de DNS d'Internet peut être assimilé à un GPS

🗨️ 29 🔄 515 ❤️ 907 📌 Tip



GRZ @GuillaumeRozier

Comment Facebook, Insta et WhatsApp ont pu tomber ?

Cloudflare (qui fournit un CDN très utilisé), a écrit un article complet qui détaille ce qui s'est passé hier soir.  
[blog.cloudflare.com/october-2021-f-...](https://blog.cloudflare.com/october-2021-f-...)

J'essaye de vous le résumer en Français #Thread [👉](#)

[Translate Tweet](#)




# Visualisation de la requête

DNS (TTL=300s)  
-> trop court!



Blog Stéphane Bortzmeyer:  
[La panne Facebook du 4 octobre 2021](#)



# Conséquences

-5% du cours de la bourse  
6 Milliards \$ (121.6B)

30x DNS queries @ Cloudflare (1.1.1.1)

A peek at [Down Detector](#) (or your Twitter feed) reveals the problems are widespread. While it's unclear exactly why the platforms are unreachable for so many people, their DNS records show that, [like last week's Slack outage](#), the problem is apparently DNS ([it's always DNS](#)). Cloudflare senior vice president Dane Knecht [notes](#) that Facebook's border gateway protocol routes — [BGP](#) helps networks pick the best path to deliver internet traffic — have been “withdrawn from the internet.”





[Instagram.com](#) is flashing a 5xx Server Error message, while the Facebook site merely tells us that something went wrong. The problem also appears to be affecting its virtual reality arm, Oculus. Users can load games they already have installed and the browser works, but social features or installing new games does not. The outage is thorough enough that it's affecting Workplace from Facebook customers and, [according to Jane Manchun Wong](#), Facebook's internal sites.



# Conséquences latérales

Alexis Kauffmann @framaka · Oct 4

Je ne veux pas en rajouter une couche mais y'a aussi ça.  
Tu es seul ce soir au milieu de nulle part car tu n'as pas réussi à ouvrir ton compte **Airbnb** inscrit avec Facebook Connect...  
[#facebookdown](#)



Sheera Frenkel ✓  
@sheeraf

Was just on phone with someone who works for FB who described employees unable to enter buildings this morning to begin to evaluate extent of outage because their badges weren't working to access doors.

1:51 PM · 10/4/21 · [Twitter for iPhone](#)




Kevin Collier ✓  
@kevincollier

“Don't yet know exactly what's behind the DNS issue that's knocked Facebook/Instagram/WhatsApp offline, but it's really bad. Pretty much everything that runs through those three companies are inaccessible. Employees can't even enter conference rooms because they're IoT!

1:07 PM · 10/4/21 · [Twitter Web App](#)




# Channels



Capture d'écran  
PFE268 (2014)



# Entrypoint / Exitpoint (Separation of concerns)



Modules: Hadoop, BI, Jobs, Loas Billing

Capture d'écran PFE268 (2014)

## PFE268 – IoT

### Realization of a distributed system

David Aparicio – Institute Eldorado  
August 2013 – July 2014  
Presentation





# Conseils

Ne pas avoir un même DNS centralisé à tous les produits (SPOF)  
Avoir un TTL plus grand (cache)

Avoir des routes de secours (Inbound/out of bound, bastions, PoP chez d'autres cloud providers)  
Avoir la documentation (accessible papier/pdf au cas-où, pour réparer le réseau/liste d'IPs)

Ne pas mettre Statuspage au même endroit que l'INFRA, idem pour la messagerie (Messenger ou Slack)  
Sinon impossible de communiquer aux clients

Séparation des préoccupations  
Ne pas se reposer uniquement sur les logiciels d'audit (code/ops)

Multi-IPs et nom de domaines (au lieu de sous-domaine)  
QoS / Prioriser les flux importants de l'entreprise (lot/Web/etc..)

Ne pas changer ses DNS (1.1.1.1) ou (8.8.8.8) de manière permanente  
(car ainsi ils ont l'historique de votre navigation web)



# Blast Effect







# Apache Zookeeper

- Créé en même temps qu'à Hadoop
- Base de beaucoup de systèmes distribuées (Kafka v<2.8 / KIP-500)
- Ancêtre de consul/etcd
- Key-Value Store hiérarchique
  
- Très bons résultats aux tests Jepsen
  
- Avantages
  - Suivre des changements sur un path (watcher)
  - Noeuds éphémères
  - Notion de sessions



# Architecture




Schéma issu du meetup Toulouse JUG: [War Story, comment les pauses du GC ont pété la prod](#)



# Conseils

Avoir un système d'automatisation des incidents (ouverture d'une war room, d'un document collaboratif, etc.)

Maintenir les versions à jour pour gagner les patch/bug fixes

Mise en place d'un circuit breaker

Règles de Warm-up / Slow startup (mode Diesel)

Ajout d'une liste d'attente (Cloudflare Waiting Room)

Chaos Monkey / Analyse des effets de bord



# NewsBlur





# Attaque ? Pas de sécurisation sur la DEV->PRD



## The NewsBlur Blog

[Visit NewsBlur >](#)

```
"query killed during yield: renamed collection 'newsblur.feed_icons' to 'newsblur.system.drop.1624498448i220t-1.feed_icons'"
```

There is honestly no set of words in that error message that I ever want to see again. What is `drop` doing in that error message? Better go find out.

Logging into the MongoDB machine to check out what state the DB is in and I come across the following...

```
nbset:PRIMARY> show dbs
READ_ME_TO_RECOVER_YOUR_DATA  0.000GB
newsblur                       0.718GB

nbset:PRIMARY> use READ_ME_TO_RECOVER_YOUR_DATA
switched to db READ_ME_TO_RECOVER_YOUR_DATA

nbset:PRIMARY> db.README.find()
{
  "_id" : ObjectId("60d3e112ac48d82047aab95d"),
  "content" : "All your data is a backed up. You must pay 0.03 BTC to
XXXXXXXXFTHISGUYXXXXXXX 48 hours for recover it. After 48 hours expiration we
will leaked and exposed all your data. In case of refusal to pay, we will
contact the General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR and notify them that you
store user data in an open form and is not safe. Under the rules of the law,
you face a heavy fine or arrest and your base dump will be dropped from our
server! You can buy bitcoin here, does not take much time to buy
https://localbitcoins.com or https://buy.moonpay.io/ After paying write to me
in the mail with your DB IP: FTHISGUY@recoverme.one and you will receive a link
to download your database dump."
}
```



Capture d'écran du post: [How a Docker footgun led to a vandal deleting NewsBlur's MongoDB database](#)



# Twitch

tb twitch-leaks-part-one

Torrent Management Mode: Manual

Save at

E:\Torrent Downloads

Remember last used save path

Torrent settings

Category:

Set as default category

Start torrent

Download in sequential order

Keep top-level folder

Download first and last pieces first

Skip hash check

Torrent information

Size: 125.89 GiB (Free space on disk: 819.50 GiB)

Date: Not available

Hash:

Comment:

Name

▼  twitch-leaks-part-one

>  twitch-payouts

3rdparty.zip

abuse.zip

admin-services.zip

ads.zip

ags-sonic.zip

amzn.zip

andaries.zip

archive.zip

astith.zip

availability.zip

awsi.zip

beefcake.zip

benherr.zip

blade-legacy.zip

bobbcarp.zip

bootcamp.zip

Size Download Priority

125.89 GiB Normal

4.88 GiB Normal

15.1 KiB Normal

3.9 MiB Normal

37.2 MiB Normal

1.14 GiB Normal

544.8 MiB Normal

44.6 MiB Normal

22.1 KiB Normal

73.2 MiB Normal

810.3 KiB Normal

239.0 MiB Normal

164.4 MiB Normal

5.8 MiB Normal

3.9 MiB Normal

2.67 GiB Normal

382.4 KiB Normal

33.9 MiB Normal





# Avoid HDD

Hype Driven Development  
ou  
face au code du monde réel



[Quentin ADAM](#)

CEO @ Clever Cloud

@[waxzce](#) on twitter





# Conseils

Hype-driven development

CI/CD

DevSecOps: Tests automatique de pénétration (pentest) sur des admin:admin, no password etc..

Isolation de la configuration DEV // PROD (Différent Jenkins ou Vault, Approbation manuelle)





# Same JVM, Shoot again





# Les limites de la technologie




Schéma extrait de Medium : [+40PB per year – The challenge of data growth at Criteo](#)  
Hadoop sous pression Retour sur une année d'exploitation à Criteo ([Rémy Saissy](#))



# Conseils

Tests de performance

Monitoring des KPI OS

Observabilité / Sondes applicatives

Serveurs de délestage (backup) pour les applications critiques



# Foxstuck





Foxstuck: Firefox browser bug boots legions of users offline ([The Register](#))



# network.http.http3.enabled: false

m
Bugzilla

Copy Summary View ▾

Closed
Bug 1749908
Opened 7 days ago
Closed 7 days ago

## Infinite loop in HTTP3 hangs socket thread

▼ **Categories**

Product: Core ▾    2022-01-13 00:18 PST = CET 8h18

Component: Networking ▾

Platform: Desktop    All

Type: defect


Priority: Not set    Severity: --

▼ **Tracking**

Status: VERIFIED DUPLICATE of [bug 1749910](#)

▶ **People** (Reporter: heftig, Unassigned)

▶ **Details**





# [Update] - Mercredi 2 Février 2022



## Retrospective and Technical Details on the recent Firefox Outage



By [Christian Holler](#)

Posted on [February 2, 2022](#) in [Firefox](#)

On January 13th 2022, Firefox became unusable for close to two hours for users worldwide. This incident interrupted many people's workflow. This post highlights the complex series of events and circumstances that, together, triggered a bug deep in the networking code of Firefox.



Retrospective and Technical Details on the recent Firefox Outage ([hacks.mozilla.org](https://hacks.mozilla.org))




# CDN








# Marmiton



connection failure




Fastly error: unknown domain: dev.to.

Details: cache-ams21071-AMS



# Fastly



## Error 503 Service Unavailable

Service Unavailable


Guru Mediation:

Details: cache-ams21041-AMS 1623148153 16274930

Varnish cache server



Schéma de [Wassim Chegham](#)




# Fallback.js

Lightweight JavaScript library for dynamically loading CSS and JS files with the ability to have fallbacks in case your CDN fails.

Mobile, Chrome, FireFox, Safari, Opera, IE 6+


[Documentation](#)

[Source Code](#)





# Resilience





# Details

## Summary of June 8 outage

We experienced a global outage due to an undiscovered software bug that surfaced on June 8 when it was triggered by a valid customer configuration change. We detected the disruption within one minute, then identified and isolated the cause, and disabled the configuration. Within 49 minutes, 95% of our network was operating as normal.

This outage was broad and severe, and we're truly sorry for the impact to our customers and everyone who relies on them.

### What happened?

On May 12, we began a software deployment that introduced a bug that could be triggered by a specific customer configuration under specific circumstances.

Early June 8, a customer pushed a valid configuration change that included the specific circumstances that triggered the bug, which caused 85% of our network to return errors.



# Conseils

Personnaliser les messages d'erreur

Tester les demandes clients (E2E/Staging/Red-Black plate-forme)

Tester les procédures du IT Runbook (Role-play afternoon)

Réponse inconnue => S'arrêter proprement



# Conclusion



---

## En bref


- [SRE Blameless culture](#) / With great power comes great responsibility
- QA / Chaos tests
- Former vos équipes : Game day / Wheel of Misfortune
- Tester fréquemment vos backups & hors d'un Drive pour les données médicaux ;-)
- CI/CD & DevSecOps pipelines
- Implémenter & monitorer les metrics importantes issues des incidents (GC Pause, etc)





# Wheel of Misfortune

Spin the Wheel!



Incident 1  
Incident 2  
Incident 3  
Incident 4  
Incident 5  
Incident 6  
Incident 7  
Incident 8

SPIN

Incident Actions

- ACKNOWLEDGE
- MITIGATE
- TRIAGE

Incident Progress

0%

Timing Controls

00:00:00

▶ ⏪ Lap

## Incident 6

You've received alerts of high HTTP 5xx error rate...







Pour aller plus loin

Entreprise / Incident		Date
AWS / Drop database <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/message/680587/">https://aws.amazon.com/message/680587/</a>	●	24/12/2012
Gitlab / Drop database <a href="https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2017/02/10/postmortem-of-database-outage-of-january-31/">https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2017/02/10/postmortem-of-database-outage-of-january-31/</a>	●	31/01/2017
DigitalOcean / Drop database <a href="https://www.digitalocean.com/blog/update-on-the-april-5th-2017-outage/">https://www.digitalocean.com/blog/update-on-the-april-5th-2017-outage/</a>	●	05/04/2017
OVHCloud / Watercooling <a href="https://blog.ovh.com/fr/blog/hebergements-web-post-mortem-incident-29-juin-2017/">https://blog.ovh.com/fr/blog/hebergements-web-post-mortem-incident-29-juin-2017/</a>		29/06/2017
Criteo / Datalake HDFS limits + Friday night & New-comer on-call <a href="https://medium.com/criteo-engineering/40pb-per-year-the-challenge-of-data-growth-at-criteo-5d5b73ec5294">https://medium.com/criteo-engineering/40pb-per-year-the-challenge-of-data-growth-at-criteo-5d5b73ec5294</a>		18/02/2018
GitHub / DataBase Split Brain <a href="https://github.blog/2018-10-30-oct21-post-incident-analysis/">https://github.blog/2018-10-30-oct21-post-incident-analysis/</a>		30/10/2018
ElasticCloud / Proxy Layer+Zookeeper <a href="https://www.elastic.co/blog/elastic-cloud-january-18-2019-incident-report">https://www.elastic.co/blog/elastic-cloud-january-18-2019-incident-report</a>	●	18/01/2019
CleverCloud / Orages à Paris (Redondance/Dépendance au network provider) <a href="https://www.clevercloudstatus.com/incident/376">https://www.clevercloudstatus.com/incident/376</a>		22/06/2021
NewsBlur / Docker PROD DB exposé sur le net, sans mot de passe <a href="https://blog.newsblur.com/2021/06/28/story-of-a-hacking/">https://blog.newsblur.com/2021/06/28/story-of-a-hacking/</a>		23/06/2021
Slack / DNS, pas de post-mortem pour le moment <a href="https://status.slack.com/2021-09-30">https://status.slack.com/2021-09-30</a>	●	30/09/2021
Facebook / BGP operations <a href="https://engineering.fb.com/2021/10/04/networking-traffic/outage/">https://engineering.fb.com/2021/10/04/networking-traffic/outage/</a>	●	04/10/2021
CloudFlare / Datacenter update & BGP <a href="https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-outage-on-june-21-2022/">https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-outage-on-june-21-2022/</a>	●	21/06/2022



danluu / **post-mortems** Public Watch 516 Unstar 8.5k Fork 333

[Code](#) [Pull requests 2](#) [Actions](#) [Projects](#) [Wiki](#) [Security](#) [Insights](#)

master 1 branch 0 tags

Go to file

Add file

Code

andygrunwald Adding new post mortem: Removing all use... 3b2b386 9 hours ago 290 commits

.github/workflows pass in github token to notfound workflow 3 months ago

README.md Adding new post mortem: Removing all users from githu... 9 hours ago

README.md

# A List of Post-mortems!

## Table of Contents

- [Config Errors](#)
- [Hardware/Power Failures](#)
- [Conflicts](#)
- [Time](#)
- [Uncategorized](#)
- [Other lists of postmortems](#)
- [Analysis](#)
- [Contributors](#)

## About

A collection of postmortems. Sorry for the delay in merging PRs!

[danluu.com/postmortem-les...](https://danluu.com/postmortem-les-...)

[debugging](#) [post-mortem](#) [hacktoberfest](#)

### Reading postmortems

I love reading postmortems. They're educational, but unlike most educational docs, they tell an entertaining story. I've spent a decent chunk of time reading postmortems at both Google and Microsoft. I haven't done any kind of formal analysis on the most common causes of bad failures (yet), but there are a handful of postmortem patterns that I keep seeing over and over again.

### Error Handling

Proper error handling code is hard. Bugs in error handling code are a major cause of *bad* problems. This means that the probability of having sequential bugs, where an error causes buggy error handling code to run, isn't just the independent probabilities of the individual errors multiplied. It's common to have cascading failures cause a serious outage. There's a sense in which this is obvious -- error handling is generally regarded as being hard. If I mention this to people they'll tell me how obvious it is that a disproportionate number of serious postmortems come out of bad error handling and cascading failures where errors are repeatedly not handled correctly. But despite this being "obvious", it's not so obvious that sufficient test and static analysis effort are devoted to making sure that error handling works.


## Releases

No releases published

## Packages

No packages published

## Contributors 86



Pour aller plus loin



<http://github.com/danluu/post-mortems>




Pour aller plus loin

[GDG Cloud Nantes] SRE ! SRE partout ! par Denis Germain - CI/CD Week with Google Cloud

## Quelles compétences ?

- Linux & les bases en réseau
- 1 langage & git
- 1 cloud provider

[Padok - De dev à SRE / Reddit - "go into DevOps"](#) / [Roadmap to DevOps](#) / [Tweet Anas Khan](#)



48:01 / 59:37



[Track 2 - 16h30] SRE ! SRE partout ! par Denis Germain



---

## Merci! Avez-vous des questions ?



N'oubliez pas de me donner votre ROTI (avis)

Et **si vous voulez d'autres histoires** sous ce format ! 😊

<https://s.42l.fr/bblworld>



Lien des slides dans les commentaires 



Rejoignez-nous sur <https://careers.ovhcloud.com>



Faites-vous confiance aux QR Codes ?

