

# Jug Summer Camp

-enjoy it-



## La sécurité dès la conception du projet

**Speaker :** David Aparicio - @dadideo



**SERLI**



# David Aparicio

@dadideo



15/ DD INSA de Lyon / UNICAMP (Brésil)

Facebook Open Academy / MIT AppInventor

17/ Dev(Sec)Ops @ AMADEUS (Nice, 2 ans)

19/ Data(Sec)Ops @ OVHcloud (Lyon, 2 ans)



# OVHcloud: Un leader européen

200k Private cloud  
VMs running




Dedicated  
IaaS  
Europe

...	...	...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...	...	...

Hosting capacity :  
**1.3M Physical  
Servers**

**360k**  
Servers already  
deployed



Own  
20Tbps  
Network  
with  
35 PoPs

30 Datacenters

> **1.3M Customers** in **138 Countries**



# OVHcloud: 4 univers de produits

**Domain / Email** ▾

- Domain names, DNS, SSL, Redirect
- Email, Open-Xchange, Exchange
- Collaborative Tools, NextCloud

**PaaS for Web** ▾

- Mutu, CloudWeb
- Plesk, CPanel
- PaaS with Platform.sh

**Virtual servers** ▾

- VPS, Dedicated Server

**SaaS** ▾

- Wordpress, Magento, Prestashop
- CRM, Billing, Payment, Stats
- MarketPlace

**Support, Managed** ▾

- Support Basic
- Support thought Partners
- Managed services

**Standalone, Cluster** ▾

- General Purpose SuperPlan
- Game T2 >20e
- Virtualization T3 >80e
- Storage T4 >300e
- Database T5 >600e
- Bigdata T5 >600e
- HCI 12KVA /32KVA
- AI
- VDI Cloud Game
- Network

**VPS aaS** ▾

- pCC DC
- Virtuozzo Cloud

**Wholesales** ▾

- IT Integrators, Cloud Storage,
- CDN, Database, ISV, WebHosting
- High Intensive CPU/GPU,

**Encrypt** ▾

- KMS, HSM
- Encrypt (SGX, Network, Storage)

**Compute** ▾

- VM K8S, IA IaaS
- Baremetal PaaS for DevOps

**Storage** ▾

- File, Block, Object, Archive

**Databases** ▾

- SQL, noSQL, Messaging,
- Dashboard

**Network** ▾

- IP FO, NAT, LB, VPN, Router,
- DNS, DHCP, TCP/SSL Offload

**Security** ▾

- IAM, MFA, Encrypt, KMS

**IA, DL** ▾

- Standard Tools for AI, AI Studio,
- IA IaaS, Hosting API AI

**Bigdata, ML, Analytics**

- DataLake, ML, Dashboard

**Hosted Private Cloud** ▾

**VMware**

- SDDC, vSAN 1AZ / 2AZ
- vCD, Tanzu, Horizon, DBaaS, DRaaS

**Nutanix**

- HCI 1AZ / 2AZ, Databases, DRaaS, VDI

**OpenStack**

- IAM, Compute (VM, K8S)
- Storage, Network, Databases

**Storage**

- Ontap Select, Nutanix File
- OpenIO, MinIO, CEPH
- Zerto, Veeam, Atempo

**AI**

- ElementAI, HuggingFace,
- Deepomatic, Systran,
- EarthCube

**Bigdata / Analytics / ML**

- Cloudera over S3, Dataiku,
- Saagie, Tableau,

**Hybrid Cloud** ▾

- vRack Connect, Edge-DC, Private DC
- Dell, HP, Cisco, OCP, MultiCloud

**Secured Cloud** ▾

- GOV, FinTech, Retail, HealthCare



# Pitch

*Salut à toi jeune développeur(euse) !  
Alors si aujourd'hui je me permets de te  
contacter, c'est pour une raison très simple:*

*Savais-tu que 95% des failles de sécurité sont  
dues à une erreur humaine ?*



# Pitch

*Alors est-ce que tu veux en faire parti ?  
Il faut que tu te poses les bonnes questions.*



# Moi je pense la question elle est vite répondeue


https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-23-year-old-windows-3-1-system-failure-crashed-paris-airport/

## A 23-year-old Windows 3.1 system failure crashed Paris airport

Some of the most important networks and systems today are woefully outdated. And that isn't always a bad thing.



By Zack Whittaker for Zero Day | November 16, 2015 -- 21:04 GMT (21:04 GMT) | Topic: Security



(Image: Imgur)

Source : [ZDNet.com](https://www.zdnet.com)

### RECOMMENDED FOR YOU

How to drive speed, scale, and cost savings with data warehouse modernization

Live Event provided by Amazon Web Services

JOIN TODAY

### MORE FROM ZACK WHITTAKER



Security  
Online security 101: Tips for protecting your privacy from hackers and spies



Security  
US government's "do not buy" list shuts out Russia, China



Security  
New Spectre attack can remotely steal secrets, researchers say



Security  
Flaw let researchers snoop on Swann smart security cameras

### NEWSLETTERS



#JSC2020

@dadideo



7

# Pour éviter cela



CYBER ATTAQUE ⚠  
SYSTEME INFORMATIQUE  
HORS SERVICE. DELAISTRES  
IMPORTANTES POUR LES PATIENTS  
NE CONSULTANT PAS POUR UNE  
URGENCE VITALE pour examens  
BIOLOGIQUES ET RADIOLOGIQUES  
TOUS LES ORDINATEURS DU  
CHU SONT TOUCHÉS.

MERCI SI VOUS LE POUVEZ  
ET NE RELEVEZ PAS D'UNE  
URGENCE VITALE DE CONSULTER  
- EN MAISON MEDICALE  
- DANS UN AUTRE SERVICE  
D'URGENCE HORS CHU.

(EUROPE - CEDRES - ELBEUF...)  
- DIEPPE - EVREUX - LE HAVRE...)

(le site est tranquillement fait pour le CHU...)

Plus d'infos : [Thread @zigazou](#)





# Plan

- Définition
- Best Practices
- Outils
- Scénarios
- Q/A



# Sécurité dès la conception

95/ SdD-"Privacy By Design"


97/ Loi allemande

10-12/ Congrès EU

2016/679/ GDPR



# DevSecOps



Source : [dodcio.defense.gov](https://dodcio.defense.gov)



# Pas copier-coller StackOverFlow

98% snippets sur la sécurité/crypto sont *insecures*


Fisher et al., 2017; Nadi et al., 2016; Das et al., 2014

Prevent cryptographic pitfalls by design



# Attention avec Docker

Number of OS vulnerabilities by docker image



Source : [The state of open source security – 2019](#)



# Attention avec vos dépendences

## Open Source Security report

- 78% of vulnerabilities are found in indirect dependencies




5

Source : [The state of open source security – 2019](#)



# Attention avec vos dépendences



[Home](#) / [Internet](#)

NEWS

## Failure to patch known ImageMagick flaw for months costs Facebook \$40k

A researcher found that Facebook was still vulnerable to the ImageTragick exploit months after it was disclosed




By [Lucian Constantin](#)

CSO Senior Writer, [IDG News Service](#) | JAN 18, 2017 12:06 PM PST

Source : [PCWorld](#) - [Remote Code Execution Exploit \(Write-up\)](#)



# Bonnes pratiques

- Principe de moindre privilège !root
  - Diminuer surface d'attaque (scratch, distroless)
  - Pas de secrets dans les Docker images
  - Pas de données sensibles dans les GUI
  - Ne pas afficher de stacktrace (pas debug)
  - Ni de version/nom de framework
  - Vérifier les entrées/sorties (injection/XSS)
  - Mettre à jour infra/docker images (CI/CD|[GitOps](#))
- PaaS (BUILD/RUN)  OVHcloud/CleverCloud





# Open Web Application Security Project

## Security by Design Principles by OWASP

1. Minimize attack surface area
2. Establish secure defaults
3. Principle of least privilege
4. Principle of defense in depth
5. Fail securely
6. Don't trust services
7. Separation of duties
8. Avoid security by obscurity
9. Keep security simple
10. Fix security issues correctly

Source : [OWASP](#)



# Prendre du recul / code

## Security by design in practice [\[edit\]](#)

Many things, especially input, should be distrusted by a secure design. A [fault-tolerant](#) program could even distrust its own internals.

Two examples of insecure design are allowing [buffer overflows](#) and [format string vulnerabilities](#). The following C program demonstrates these flaws:

```
#include <stdio.h>

int main()
{
    char a_chBuffer[100];

    printf("What is your name?\n");
    gets(a_chBuffer);
    printf("Hello, ");
    printf(a_chBuffer);
    printf("!\n");

    return 0;
}
```

Source : [Deprecated code](#)



*«David, c'est quand que tu vas mettre  
des paillettes dans ma vie ?»*



# Outils

- [linter/npm-audit](#) (Code), [SonarQube](#) (QA), [Gitlab SAST](#) / [Argo/GitHub](#) (CI), [Saucs/Clair/Anchore/Dagda](#) (CVE),
- [OpenSCAP](#) (Audit), [Cilium](#) (Network), [gVisor/Kata](#) (Sandbox), [Istio/maesh](#) (SSL), [Notary](#) (Sign.),
- [Falco](#) (K8s Monitor), [42Crunch](#) (API Scan), [Burp Suite](#) / [SuperTruder/ffuf](#) (Vuln.Web), [OWASP ZAP](#) (Proxy),
- [GitGuardian](#) (Secret), [Parrot](#), [Kali](#), [RedHat](#) (OS), [YesWeHack](#), [Yogosha](#) (Bounty)




# Docker CLI



Guillaume 🐶  
@glours

Replying to @glours @silvin\_docker and 2 others

With a better Gif and a link to the documentation  
[docs.docker.com/engine/scan/](https://docs.docker.com/engine/scan/)



```
~/docker/scan (zsh) 261 ..an-cli-plugin (zsh) 262
100%
docker scan hello-world
Testing hello-world...
Organization: docker-desktop-test
Package manager: linux
Project name: docker-image|hello-world
Docker image: hello-world
Licenses: enabled


/ Tested hello-world for known issues, no vulnerable paths found.
Note that we do not currently have vulnerability data for your image.
```

12:11 PM · Sep 2, 2020 · TweetDeck

Source : [Vulnerability scanning - Docker Documentation](https://docs.docker.com/engine/scan/)



# Snyk



1  
known vulnerability

49  
total dependencies

1 H 0 M 0 L

Review the status of your projects on your dashboard. [View on Snyk](#)

If you have any questions, [we're happy to help](#).

Stay secure!  
The Snyk team

Source : [Email report](#)



# Sonar

```
246 if (Provider.class == roleTypeClass) {
247     Type providedType = ReflectionUtils.getLastTypeGenericArgument(dependen
248     2 Class providedClass = 1 ReflectionUtils.getTypeClass(providedType);
249
250     if (this.componentManager.hasComponent(providedType, dependencyDescript
251         || 3 providedClass.isAssignableFrom(List.class) || providedClass.

```

A "NullPointerException" could be thrown; "providedClass" is nullable here.

🐛 Bug    ⬆️ Major    cert, cwe

```
252     continue;
253 }
```

		New code Since last release	
<b>Reliability</b>			
🐛 Bugs	2	B	1 B
<b>Security</b>			
🔒 Security Vulnerabilities	0	A	0 A
🛡️ Security Hotspots	39	-	0 -
<b>Maintainability</b>			
🕒 Technical Debt	6 days	C	0 A
🧠 Code Smells	319	-	0 -



Source : [Sonar website](#)



# CI/CD

Pipeline Jobs 5




Source : [https://twitter.com/k33g\\_org/](https://twitter.com/k33g_org/)





# Falco

- Runtime detection
- Alerts



Source : [Kris Nova, Fixing the Kubernetes clusterfuck @FOSDEM](#)



# Pourquoi ?

## OWASP TOP 10 – 2013

- A1 – Injection
- A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management
- A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- A4 – Insecure Direct Object References **[Merged + A7]**
- A5 – Security Misconfiguration
- A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure
- A7 – Missing Function Level Access Control **[Merged + A4]**
- A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
- A9 – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
- A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

## OWASP TOP 10 – 2017

- A1 – Injection
- A2 – Broken Authentication
- A3 – Sensitive Data Exposure
- A4 – XML External Entities (XXE) **[NEW]**
- A5 – Broken Access Control **[MERGED]**
- A6 – Security Misconfiguration
- A7 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- A8 – Insecure Deserialization **[NEW, COMMUNITY]**
- A9 – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
- A10 – Insufficient Logging & Monitoring **[NEW, COMMUNITY]**

Source: [https://www.owasp.org/images/7/72/OWASP\\_Top\\_10-2017\\_%28en%29.pdf.pdf](https://www.owasp.org/images/7/72/OWASP_Top_10-2017_%28en%29.pdf.pdf)

Source : [OWASP Top 10](#)



# Still alive



pry - Ben Bidmead and Guillaume Bonnet liked

**HAKLUKE** @hakluke

HTML injection is ">alive and well

5:00 AM · Sep 9, 2020 · Twitter Web App

3 Retweets 106 Likes

**HAKLUKE** @hakluke · 7h  
Replying to @hakluke  
jks... unicode

**KUNDU IV** @debangshu\_kundu · 6h  
Replying to @hakluke  
Thank you for your submission however this issue is considered to be a P5 (Informational) finding as per XYZ's Vulnerability Rating Taxonomy, and therefore typically does not qualify for a reward.

**Rudra16** @rudra16t · 6h  
We are looking forward for more submission from you. Happy Hacking 🙌

**Adil Burak** @adilburaksen · 4h  
Replying to @hakluke  
If it's use with XSS bypass then useful. Otherwise it's not effective vuln.

Source : <https://twitter.com/hakluke/>



# Gendarmerie nationale

*" L'entrée en vigueur du RGPD modifie la posture des acteurs (des traitements) qui doivent tenir compte des impératifs de sécurité dès la conception d'un produit ainsi que son cycle de vie. Le label « by design » devient un label de qualité qui constituera un atout commercial. "*



# 2022

- 90% des développements logiciels se déclaront DevSecOps (+40% 2019)
- 25% des développements IT selon DevOps (+10% 2019)



Source : [Gartner/Techwire](#)



# Risque humain ?

ars TECHNICA [BIZ & IT](#) [TECH](#) [SCIENCE](#) [POLICY](#) [CARS](#) [GAMING & CULTURE](#) [STO](#)

ELON SPEAKS —

## Russian tourist offered employee \$1 million to cripple Tesla with malware

“This was a serious attack,” Elon Musk says.

DAN GOODIN - 8/28/2020, 4:12 AM



Enlarge

Source : [Ars Technica](#)



# Snyk TL;DR

## TL;DR - The state of open source security 2019 report, at a glance



### Open source adoption

- ▶ Growth in indexed packages, 2017 to 2018
  - ⬆ Maven Central - 102%
  - ⬆ PyPI - 40%
  - ⬆ npm - 37%
  - ⬆ NuGet - 26%
  - ⬆ RubyGems - 5.6%
- ▶ npm reported 304 billion downloads for 2018
- ▶ 78% of vulnerabilities are found in indirect dependencies



### Known vulnerabilities

- ▶ 88% growth in application vulnerabilities over two years
- ▶ In 2018, vulnerabilities for npm grew by 47%. Maven Central and PHP Packagist disclosures grew by 27% and 56% respectively
- ▶ In 2018, we tracked over 4 times more vulnerabilities found in RHEL, Debian and Ubuntu as compared to 2017



### Known vulnerabilities in docker images

- ▶ Each of the top ten most popular default docker images contains at least 30 vulnerable system libraries
- ▶ 44% of scanned docker images can fix known vulnerabilities by updating their base image tag



### Vulnerability identification

- ▶ 37% of open source developers don't implement any sort of security testing during CI and 54% of developers don't do any docker image security testings
- ▶ The median time from when a vulnerability was added to an open source package until it was fixed was over 2 years



### Who's responsible for open source security?

- ▶ 81% of users feel developers are responsible for open source security
- ▶ 68% of users feel that developers should own the security responsibility of their docker container images
- ▶ Only three in ten open source maintainers consider themselves to have high security knowledge



### Snyk stats

- ▶ In the second half of 2018 alone, Snyk opened more than 70,000 Pull Requests for its users to remediate vulnerabilities in their projects
- ▶ CVE/NVD and public vulnerability databases miss many vulnerabilities, only accounting for 60% of the vulnerabilities Snyk tracks
- ▶ In 2018 alone, 500 vulnerabilities were disclosed by Snyk's proprietary dedicated research team

Source : [The state of open source security – 2019](#)



# Pour aller plus loin

- [Sophia Security Camp 2019](#)
- [ANSSI Sécurité Agile](#) (Atelier d'analyse de risque)





# Analogie

*« Nul n'est censé ignorer la loi »*



# Ma devise

*« Nul développeur n'est censé ignorer la sécurité »*



# Merci pour votre attention !



#JSC2020

@dadideo



35

# Avez-vous des questions ?



PS: Oui, j'essayerais 😊  
[#LaQuestionElleEstViteRépondue](#)



We think of DNS as a lookup.

```
>nslookup tesla.com
name: tesla.com
address: 199.66.11.62
```

where is Tesla.com?

But each DNS lookup request sends data to a server.

mysecret.paypa1.com

I can put any info I want in here! (subdomain)

And it'll get sent to the DNS server config'd for this domain.

How do I steal this file w/o getting detected?

Top Secret.docx

Email, FTP, Dropbox, USB

Blocked!

First, I can encode it with base64 (or similar)

```
Q4 Profit
$15M
UTQg UHJvZ
24czogLG
```

Plain text, easy for DLP to scan

Encoded, DLP can't make sense of it

Outbound DNS is usually allowed on corporate networks.

MEGACORP

port 53 open!

DNS

And it's a very noisy protocol to monitor & analyze.

```
dns.log
Sep 30 18:18:57 dds named
Sep 30 18:18:58 dds named
Sep 30 18:18:58 dds named
Sep 30 18:19:59 dds named
Sep 30 19:19:02 dds named
Sep 30 19:19:02 dds named
Sep 30 19:19:02 dds named
```

Yikes!

Then I chop up my base64 file into small chunks that each fit into a DNS query.

```
UTQg.paypa1.com
UHcz.paypa1.com
24og.paypa1.com
www.google.com
www.twitter.com
```

Then tuck all the "bad" DNS queries in with the thousands of "good" ones

When the evil queries arrive at the attacker's paypa1.com DNS server they are logged and pieced back together.

```
UTQg +
UHcz +
24og
stick together
```

decode base64

Top Secret.docx



Source : [Exfiltration DNS @Rob Sobers](#)



# Maturité des équipes

Business Unit	Awareness and Training	Compliance and IT Audit	Emerging IT/Threats	Incident Response (IR)	Operations and Support	SDLC	PMO
1	2	3	2	1	2	2	3
2	3	2	3	2	3	2	2
3	2	3	2	1	2	1	3
4	3	3	2	2	3	3	3
5	2	2	3	1	1	2	1
6	2	3	2	1	1	2	2
7	3	2	3	2	3	2	3
8	3	3	3	3	3	3	3



# Pas de MEP / Failure Fridays

https://dastergon.gr/wheel-of-misfortune/


## Wheel of Misfortune

A role-playing game for incident management training  
*Inspired by the Site Reliability Engineering book*

Instructions

### Incident 6

You've received alerts of high HTTP 5xx error rate...



Timing controls

▶ || ⏪ Lap Clear

00:02:60

Pavlos Ratis | 2019

Source : [PagerDuty, 121, 200 tickets opened, 3 full AZ failures](#)



# OVHcloud Datacenters

